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Abstract
This paper gives game-theoretic versions of several results on “merging
of opinions” obtained in measure-theoretic probability and algorithmic
randomness theory. An advantage of the game-theoretic versions over the
measure-theoretic results is that they are pointwise, their advantage over
the algorithmic randomness results is that they are non-asymptotic, but
the most important advantage over both is that they are very constructive,
giving explicit and efficient strategies for players in a game of prediction.
1 Introduction
The idea that the predictions made by two forecasters will become closer with
increasing information goes back at least to de Finetti (1937, Chapter V); see
also Savage 1954, §3.6. De Finetti’s assumption was that both forecasters com-
pute their predictions from exchangeable probability measures that are not too
close to a power probability measure; in detail he considered only binary predic-
tion from this point of view. Later it became quite popular in Bayesian statistics
since it renders an element of objectivity to the subjective probability measures.
A similar phenomenon is also known in economics under the name of
“Hotelling’s law” (after Hotelling 1929) or the “principle of minimum differ-
entiation”.
The first general mathematical result about convergence of predictions
made by successful forecasters appears to be Blackwell and Dubins’s paper
(1962). Blackwell and Dubins’s result was about infinite-horizon forecasting,
whereas in this paper we will be interested in one-step ahead forecasting. (In
game-theoretic probability, Blackwell and Dubins’s setting is much less natu-
ral, since there are no stochastic assumptions imposed on what happens out-
side the protocol.) An important paper in this direction was Kabanov et al.
(1977) (see also Shiryaev 1996, Sect. VII.6, Jacod and Shiryaev 2003, and
Greenwood and Shiryaev 1985), which generalized earlier results by Kakutani
(1948) and by Ha´jek (1958) and Feldman (1958). The main disadvantage of
the approach of these papers is that it is “bulk”, stated in terms of absolute
continuity and singularity of probability measures.
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One way to obtain pointwise results about merging of opinions is to use the
algorithmic theory of randomness. The first result of this kind was proved by
Dawid (1985) (who refers to it as “Jeffreys’s law” in Dawid 1984 and Dawid
2004). Dawid’s result was for his version of von Mises’s notion of randomness
based on subsequence selection rules, and so his notion of merging was rather
weak. A result based on the standard notion of randomness was obtained by
Vovk (1987a) and later extended by Fujiwara (2007).
The algorithmic randomness approach has two major weaknesses. First,
since it is based on the notion of computability, it imposes heavy restrictions
on the types of measurable spaces it can deal with (typically one considers
just finite or countable observation spaces Ω). Second, it is asymptotic in the
sense that it never provides us with explicit inequalities. The von Mises-type
notion of randomness does not assert anything at all about finite sequences of
observations. But even the modern definitions (such as those due to Martin-Lo¨f,
Levin, and Schnorr) are based on a notion (the deficiency of randomness) that
is defined only to within an additive constant and so can only be applied to
finite sequences en masse.
The game-theoretic approach to probability was suggested in Vovk (1993)
and developed in, e.g., Dawid and Vovk (1999), Shafer and Vovk (2001),
Kumon et al. (2007). This approach makes it possible to use all flexibility
of the algorithmic randomness approach without paying its high price; in
particular, all our statements are either non-asymptotic or can be stated in a
non-asymptotic manner.
2 Merging of opinions as criterion of success
Let Ω be a measurable space and P(Ω) stand for the set of all probability
measures on Ω; elements of Ω will be called observations and measurable subsets
of Ω will be called local events. Suppose we have two forecasters at each step
issuing probability forecasts for the next observation ωn ∈ Ω to be chosen by
reality. The game-theoretic process of testing the forecasters’ predictions can
be represented in the following form.
Competitive testing protocol
Players: Reality, Forecaster I, Sceptic I, Forecaster II, Sceptic II
Protocol:
KI0 := 1.
KII0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster I announces P In ∈ P(Ω).
Forecaster II announces P IIn ∈ P(Ω).
Sceptic II announces f IIn : Ω→ [0,∞] such that
∫
f IIn dP
II
n = 1.
Sceptic I announces f In : Ω→ [0,∞] such that
∫
f IndP
I
n = 1.
Reality announces ωn ∈ Ω.
KIn := KIn−1f In(ωn).
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KIIn := KIIn−1f IIn (ωn).
END FOR
The predictions output by Forecaster I are tested by Sceptic I, and the predic-
tions output by Forecaster II are tested by Sceptic II. The Sceptics’ success in
detecting inadequacy of the Forecasters’ predictions is measured by their capital,
KIn and KIIn , respectively. The initial capital is 1 and the game is fair from the
point of view of the Forecasters. The value of KIn (resp. KIIn ) is interpreted as
the degree to which Sceptic I (resp. Sceptic II) managed to discredit Forecaster
I’s (resp. Forecaster II’s) predictions. The requirement that the Sceptics choose
functions f In and f
II
n taking nonnegative values reflects the restriction that they
should never risk bankruptcy by gambling more than their current capital.
In our protocol we allow infinite values for the functions chosen by the Scep-
tics and, therefore, infinite values for their capital. We will use the convention
0∞ := 0.
Let α /∈ {−1, 1}. For two probability measures P I and P II on Ω we define
the α-divergence between them as
D(α)
(
P I ‖ P II) := 4
1− α2
(
1−
∫
Ω
(βI(ω))
1−α
2 (βII(ω))
1+α
2 Q(dω)
)
(1)
(with the same convention 0∞ := 0) where Q is any probability measure on Ω
such that P I ≪ Q and P II ≪ Q, βI is any version of the density of P I w.r. to
Q and βII is any version of the density of P II w.r. to Q. (For example, one can
set Q := (P I + P II)/2; it is clear that the value of the integral does not depend
on the choice of Q, βI and βII.) The expression (1) is always nonnegative: see,
e.g., Amari and Nagaoka (2000). An important special case is the Hellinger
distance, corresponding to α = 0 and also given by the formula
D(0)
(
P I ‖ P II) = 2 ∫
Ω
(√
βI(ω)−
√
βII(ω)
)2
Q(dω).
(Sometimes “Hellinger distance” refers to 12D
0(P I, P II), as in Vovk 1987a, or to√
D0(P I, P II).)
For simplicity, in the main part of this section we will only consider the case
where Forecaster II is “timid” on the given play of the game, in the sense that
he does not deviate too much from Forecaster I. Formally, Forecaster II is timid
if, for all n, P In ≪ P IIn (intuitively, if Forecaster II never declares a local event
null unless it is already null according to Forecaster I). It should be remembered
that the assumption of timidity is always imposed on the realized play of the
game rather than on Forecaster II’s strategy (in general, Forecaster II is not
assumed to follow a strategy).
The following asymptotic result will be proved in Sect. 4 (its counterpart in
the algorithmic theory of randomness has been recently proved by Fujiwara 2007,
Theorem 3; in the special case α = 0 it was obtained in Vovk 1987a). We will
say that Sceptic I (resp. Sceptic II) becomes infinitely rich if limn→∞KIn = ∞
(resp. limn→∞KIIn =∞).
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Theorem 1a Let α ∈ (−1, 1). In the competitive testing protocol:
1. The Sceptics have a joint strategy guaranteeing that at least one of them
will become infinitely rich if
∞∑
n=1
D(α)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
=∞ (2)
and Forecaster II is timid.
2. Sceptic I has a strategy guaranteeing that he will become infinitely rich if
∞∑
n=1
D(α)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
<∞, (3)
Sceptic II becomes infinitely rich, and Forecaster II is timid.
Sceptic I (resp. Sceptic II) becoming infinitely rich in this theorem can also be
understood as lim supn→∞KIn = ∞ (resp. lim supn→∞KIIn = ∞); in the next
subsection we will see that this understanding of “infinitely rich” leads to an
equivalent statement.
Remark Fujiwara (2007, Section 3.1) gives a simple example showing that
Theorem 1a (namely, its Part 1) cannot be extended to the case |α| ≥ 1.
Before discussing the intuition behind Theorem 1a, it will be convenient to
introduce some terminology (in part informal). We will say that Forecaster I
(resp. Forecaster II) is successful (for a particular play of the game) if Sceptic I
(resp. Sceptic II) does not become infinitely rich. We say that a Forecaster is re-
liable if we believe, even before the start of the game, that he will be successful.
For example, the Forecaster might know the true stochastic mechanism pro-
ducing the observations, or his predictions may be computed from a well-tested
theory.
Part 1 of the theorem says that either (3) holds or at least one of the Sceptics
becomes infinitely rich. Therefore, if both Forecasters are reliable, we expect
their predictions to be close in the sense of (3).
Suppose we only know that Forecaster I is reliable; for concreteness, let
us impose on Reality the requirement that KIn should stay bounded. If the
Sceptics invest a fraction (arbitrarily small) of their initial capital in strategies
whose existence is guaranteed in Theorem 1a, we will have(
lim sup
n→∞
KIIn <∞
)
⇐⇒
(
∞∑
n=1
D(α)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
<∞
)
.
(In the context of algorithmic randomness theory this equivalence is called a
criterion of randomness in Vovk 1987a and Fujiwara 2007.)
In the following sections we will see several elaborations of Theorem 1a. One
useful interpretation of our results is where Forecaster I computes his predic-
tions using some well-tested stochastic theory, and we believe him to be reliable.
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Forecaster II represents an alternative way of forecasting. We will be interested
in the relation between the deviation of Forecaster II’s predictions from Fore-
caster I’s predictions and the degree of the former’s success, as measured by
Sceptic II’s capital.
2.1 Equivalence of the two senses of becoming infinitely
rich
Let us first simplify the competitive testing protocol:
Testing protocol
Players: Reality, Forecaster, Sceptic
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P(Ω).
Sceptic announces fn : Ω→ [0,∞] such that
∫
fndPn = 1.
Reality announces ωn ∈ Ω.
Kn := Kn−1fn(ωn).
END FOR
Now we have only one Forecaster and one Sceptic. We again refer to Kn as
Sceptic’s capital at time n.
The proof of the following lemma will give an efficient procedure transform-
ing a strategy for Sceptic into another strategy for Sceptic such that the second
strategy makes Sceptic infinitely rich in the sense limKn = ∞ whenever the
first strategy makes him infinitely rich in the sense lim supKn = ∞. If S is a
strategy for Sceptic, P1ω1P2ω2 . . . is a sequence of moves by Forecaster and Re-
ality, and n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let Kn(S, P1ω1P2ω2 . . .) be Sceptic’s capital achieved
when playing S against Forecaster and Reality playing P1ω1P2ω2 . . . .
Lemma 1 For any strategy S for Sceptic there exists another strategy S ′ for
Sceptic such that, for all P1ω1P2ω2 . . .,
lim sup
n→∞
Kn(S, P1ω1P2ω2 . . .) =∞ =⇒ lim
n→∞
Kn(S ′, P1ω1P2ω2 . . .) =∞. (4)
Proof This proof will use the argument from Vovk and Shafer (2005) (the end
of the proof of Theorem 3), which we learned from Sasha Shen; for another
argument, see Shafer and Vovk (2001), Lemma 3.1.
Let S be any strategy for Sceptic. The transformed strategy S ′ works as
follows. Start playing S until Kn exceeds 2 (play S forever if Kn never exceeds
2). As soon as this happens, set 1 aside and continue playing S with the initial
active capital Kn−1 until the active capital exceeds 2. As soon as this happens,
set another 1 aside (decreasing the active capital by this amount) and continue
playing S until the active capital exceeds 2, etc.
Formally, if at the beginning of some step n the capital Kn−1 attained by
S ′ includes active capital Kactn−1, with Kn−1 − Kactn−1 set aside earlier, and S
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recommends move fn, the move recommended by S ′ is
f ′n :=
Kactn−1
Kn−1 fn +
Kn−1 −Kactn−1
Kn−1 ,
so that Sceptic’s capital becomes Kactn−1fn(ωn)+(Kn−1−Kactn−1) at the end of step
n. Now (4) follows from the fact that Sceptic will set aside another 1 infinitely
often when the antecedent of (4) is satisfied.
2.2 General theorem about merging of opinions
In this subsection we drop the assumption that Forecaster II is timid; unfor-
tunately, this will make the statement of the theorem more complicated (it is
easy to see that Theorem 1a itself becomes false if the assumption of Sceptic II’s
timidity is removed). Even the competitive testing protocol has to be modified.
Let us say that (EI, EII), where EI and EII are local events, is an exceptional
pair for P I, P II ∈ P(Ω) if P I(EI) = 0, P II(EII) = 0, and
P I(E) = 0⇐⇒ P II(E) = 0
for all E ⊆ Ω \ (EI ∪ EII).
Modified competitive testing protocol
Players: Reality, Forecaster I, Sceptic I, Forecaster II, Sceptic II
Protocol:
KI0 := 1.
KII0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster I announces P In ∈ P(Ω).
Forecaster II announces P IIn ∈ P(Ω).
Reality announces an exceptional pair (EIn, E
II
n ) for P
I
n, P
II
n .
Sceptic II announces f IIn : Ω→ [0,∞] such that
∫
f IIn dP
II
n = 1.
Sceptic I announces f In : Ω→ [0,∞] such that
∫
f IndP
I
n = 1.
Reality announces ωn ∈ Ω.
KIn := KIn−1f In(ωn).
KIIn := KIIn−1f IIn (ωn).
END FOR
The identity of the player who announces an exceptional pair does not matter
as long as it is not one of the Sceptics. One way to chose (EI, EII) is to choose
βI and βII first and then set EI := {βI = 0} and EII := {βII = 0}.
Without the condition of timidity of Forecaster II, the condition of agreement
(3) between the Forecasters has to be replaced by
∞∑
n=1
D(α)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
<∞ and ∀n : ωn /∈ EIn ∪ EIIn . (5)
Theorem 1b Let α ∈ (−1, 1). In the modified competitive testing protocol:
6
1. The Sceptics have a joint strategy guaranteeing that at least one of them
will become infinitely rich if (5) is violated.
2. Sceptic I has a strategy guaranteeing that he will become infinitely rich if
(5) holds and Sceptic II becomes infinitely rich.
3 Non-asymptotic version
In many cases it will be more convenient to use the following modification of
the α-divergence (1) between two probability measures P I and P II on Ω:
D[α]
(
P I ‖ P II) := 4
α2 − 1 ln
∫
Ω
(βI(ω))
1−α
2 (βII(ω))
1+α
2 Q(dω), (6)
where the constant α is different from −1 and 1; D[α] (P I ‖ P II) will also be
referred to as α-divergence. The expression (6) is nonnegative: this follows
from the fact that (1) is nonnegative. When P I and P II are close to each other
(in the sense that ∫
Ω
(βI(ω))
1−α
2 (βII(ω))
1+α
2 Q(dω), (7)
called the Hellinger integral of order 1−α2 , is close to 1), the ratio of (6) to (1)
is close to 1. In any case, the inequality lnx ≤ x− 1 (for x ≥ 0) implies that
|α| < 1 =⇒ D(α) (P I ‖ P II) ≤ D[α] (P I ‖ P II)
|α| > 1 =⇒ D(α) (P I ‖ P II) ≥ D[α] (P I ‖ P II) . (8)
In principle, it is possible that D(α)
(
P I ‖ P II) = ∞: this happens when the
Hellinger integral in (6) is zero (for |α| < 1) or infinity (for |α| > 1).
Remark The version (6) coincides, to within a constant factor and reparam-
eterization, with Re´nyi’s (1961) information gain, which in our context can be
written as
Dα
(
P I, P II
)
:=
1
α− 1 log
∫
Ω
(βI(ω))α(βII(ω))1−αQ(dω), α > 0, α 6= 1, (9)
log standing for the binary logarithm. However, we will never use the definition
(9) in this paper; an important advantage of (6) is that, for any constants α1
and α2, the ratio of the divergences D
[α1](P I ‖P II) and D[α2](P I ‖P II) (as well
as the divergences D(α1)(P I ‖ P II) and D(α2)(P I ‖ P II)) is close to 1 for P I and
P II that are close to each other (in the sense of βI/βII ≈ 1).
The main result of this section is the following non-asymptotic version of
Theorems 1a and 1b.
Theorem 2 In the competitive testing protocol:
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1. For any α ∈ R, α /∈ {−1, 1}, the Sceptics have a joint strategy guaranteeing
that, for all N ,
2
1 + α
lnKIN +
2
1− α lnK
II
N =
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
. (10)
2. For any α ∈ (−∞,−1), Sceptic I has a strategy guaranteeing, for all N ,
2
1 + α
lnKIN +
2
1− α lnK
II
N ≤
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
. (11)
We regard (10) and (11) to be true if their left-hand side is an indefinite expres-
sion of the form ∞−∞.
Part 1 of Theorem 2 is analogous to Part 1 of Theorem 1a. We will only
be interested in the inequality “≥” of (10) for α ∈ (−1, 1) (for such αs both
coefficients 21+α and
2
1−α are positive). By (8) this inequality then implies
2
1 + α
lnKIN +
2
1− α lnK
II
N ≥
N∑
n=1
D(α)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
,
which is a precise quantification of Part 1 of Theorem 1a.
Part 2 of Theorem 2 greatly strengthens the inequality “≤” of (10) in the
case α < −1. Not only can this inequality be attained when the Sceptics
collaborate with each other, but Sceptic I alone can enforce it, even if Sceptic
II plays against him. It is close to being a quantification of Part 2 of Theorem
1a. There is, however, an essential difference between Part 2 of Theorem 2 and
Part 2 of Theorem 1a: α < −1 in the former and α ∈ (−1, 1) in the latter.
By (8), inequality (11) will continue to hold if D[α] is replaced by D(α). An
important special case is where α = −3 (considered in Vovk 1987a, Theorem
1); the (−3)-divergence becomes the χ2 distance
D(−3)
(
P I ‖ P II) = 1
2
∫
Ω
(βI(ω)− βII(ω))2
βII(ω)
Q(dω)
(in the notation of (1) and assuming βII > 0; there is no coefficient 12 in Vovk
1987a).
In the rest of this section we will prove Theorem 2 mainly following Vovk
(1987a) and Fujiwara (2007). There are, however, two important differences.
First, our argument will be much more precise as compared to the O(1) accuracy
of the algorithmic theory of randomness. Second, we will pay careful attention to
the “exceptional” cases where βIn = 0 or β
II
n = 0; this corresponds to getting rid
of the assumption of local absolute continuity in measure-theoretic probability
(accomplished by Pukelsheim 1986).
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3.1 Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 2
Let Sceptic I play the strategy
f In :=
(
βIIn /β
I
n
) 1+α
2∫
(βIn)
1−α
2 (βIIn )
1+α
2 dQn
=
(
βIIn
βIn
) 1+α
2
exp
(
1− α2
4
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
))
(12)
(the Hellinger integral in the first denominator is just the normalizing constant)
and Sceptic II play the strategy
f IIn :=
(
βIn/β
II
n
) 1−α
2∫
(βIn)
1−α
2 (βIIn )
1+α
2 dQn
=
(
βIn
βIIn
) 1−α
2
exp
(
1− α2
4
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
))
. (13)
From
(
f In
) 2
1+α
(
f IIn
) 2
1−α
= exp
(
1− α
2
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+
1 + α
2
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
))
= exp
(
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
))
we now obtain (10).
Let us now look more carefully at the case where some of the denominators
in (12) or (13) are zero and so the above argument is not applicable directly. If
the Hellinger integral (7) at time n,∫
Ω
(βIn(ω))
1−α
2 (βIIn (ω))
1+α
2 Q(dω), (14)
is zero, the probability measures P In and P
II
n are mutually singular. Choose a
local event E such that P In(E) = P
II
n (Ω \ E) = 0. If the Sceptics choose
f In(ω) :=
{
∞ if ω ∈ E
1 otherwise,
f IIn (ω) :=
{
1 if ω ∈ E
∞ otherwise,
(10) will be guaranteed to hold: both sides will be ∞.
Let us now suppose that the Hellinger integral (14) is non-zero. In (12) and
(13), we interpret 0/0 as 1 (and, of course, t/0 as ∞ for t > 0). As soon as the
local event (
βIn = 0 & β
II
n > 0
)
or
(
βIn > 0 & β
II
n = 0
)
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happens for the first time (if it ever happens), the Sceptics stop playing, in the
sense of selecting f IN = f
II
N := 1 for all N > n. This will make sure that (10)
always holds (in the sense of the convention introduced after the statement of
the theorem).
3.2 Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 2
Fix α < −1 and consider two strategies for Sceptic I: the one he played before,
(12), and the strategy
f In =
βIIn
βIn
f IIn . (15)
Investing a fraction c ∈ (0, 1) of his initial capital of 1 in strategy (12) and
investing the rest, 1− c, in strategy (15), Sceptic I achieves a capital of
c
N∏
n=1
(
βIIn
βIn
) 1+α
2
exp
(
1− α2
4
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
))
+ (1− c)KIIN
N∏
n=1
βIIn
βIn
. (16)
To get rid of the likelihood ratio x :=
∏N
n=1(β
II
n /β
I
n), we bound (16) from below
by
inf
x>0
(
cx
1+α
2 exp
(
1− α2
4
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
))
+ (1− c)KIINx
)
(17)
=
((−1− α
2
) 2
1−α
+
(
2
−1− α
)− 1+α
1−α
)
c
2
1−α (1− c)− 1+α1−α (18)
× exp
(
1 + α
2
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)) (KIIN)− 1+α1−α . (19)
To optimize this lower bound, we find c such that
c
2
1−α (1− c)− 1+α1−α → max,
which gives
c =
2
1− α.
For this value of c, the expression on line (18) equals((−1− α
2
) 2
1−α
+
(
2
−1− α
)− 1+α
1−α
)(
2
1− α
) 2
1−α
(−1− α
1− α
)− 1+α
1−α
= 1.
In combination with (19) this gives
KIN ≥ exp
(
1 + α
2
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
))(KIIN)− 1+α1−α .
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Taking the logarithm of both sides and regrouping, we obtain (11).
It remains to consider the exceptional cases. If the Hellinger integral (14)
is infinite (this happens when P In is not absolutely continuous w.r. to P
II
n ), the
right-hand side of (11) is also infinite, and there is nothing to prove. Suppose
(14) is finite. When βIn = 0, we will interpret the expressions (12) and (15) as∞
(this will not affect
∫
f IndP
I
n; in principle, it is now possible that
∫
f IndP
I
n < 1,
but this can only hurt Sceptic I). When βIn > 0 & β
II
n = 0, we, naturally,
interpret (12) as ∞. In both cases Sceptic I’s capital becomes infinite when
βIn = 0 or β
II
n = 0, and (11) still holds.
4 Proof of Theorems 1a and 1b
Part 1 of Theorems 1a and 1b immediately follows from Part 1 of Theorem 2 (in
the case of Theorem 1b, the Forecasters’ moves f In and f
II
n have to be slightly
redefined by setting them to ∞ on EI and EII, respectively). Therefore, in this
section we will only prove Part 2 of Theorems 1a and 1b. Instead of deducing
this result from Part 2 of Theorem 2 (as was done in Vovk 1987a and Fujiwara
2007), we will prove it using methods of the theory of martingales and adapting
the proof given in Shiryaev (1996, Theorem VII.6.4).
The following lemma from Fujiwara (2007) shows that all α-divergences,
α ∈ (−1, 1), coincide to within a constant factor. We will be using the words
“increasing” and “decreasing” in the wide sense (e.g., a constant function qual-
ifies as both increasing and decreasing).
Lemma 2 Let P ′, P ′′ ∈ P(Ω). The function (1− α)D(α)(P ′, P ′′) is decreasing
in α ∈ (−1, 1). The function (1 + α)D(α)(P ′, P ′′) is increasing in α ∈ (−1, 1).
Proof See the proof of Lemma 10 in Fujiwara (2007, Appendix B).
Therefore, we could restrict ourselves only to the Hellinger distance. We will,
however, consider the general case (as Fujiwara 2007).
We will be concerned with the following slight modification of the testing
protocol.
Semimartingale protocol (multiplicative representation)
Players: Reality, Forecaster, Sceptic
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P(Ω).
Reality announces measurable ξn : Ω→ R.
Sceptic announces fn : Ω→ [0,∞] such that
∫
fndPn = 1.
Reality announces ωn ∈ Ω.
Kn := Kn−1fn(ωn).
END FOR
Themartingale protocol (resp. submartingale protocol, supermartingale protocol)
differs from the semimartingale protocol in that Reality is required to ensure
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that, for all n, the function ξn is Pn-integrable and
∫
ξndPn is zero (resp. non-
negative, nonpositive).
An event is a property of the play (Pn, ξn, fn, ωn)
∞
n=1. We say that Sceptic
can force an event E if he has a strategy guaranteeing that either E holds or
Kn →∞ as n→∞. Lemma 1 shows that replacing Kn →∞ by lim supnKn =
∞ gives an equivalent definition.
Another representation of the semimartingale protocol is:
Semimartingale protocol (additive representation)
Players: Reality, Forecaster, Sceptic
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P(Ω).
Reality announces measurable ξn : Ω→ R.
Sceptic announces gn : Ω→ [−Kn−1,∞] such that
∫
gndPn = 0.
Reality announces ωn ∈ Ω.
Kn := Kn−1 + gn(ωn).
END FOR
The correspondence between the two representations of the semimartingale pro-
tocol is given by gn = (fn − 1)Kn−1. We will switch at will between the two
representations.
If Sceptic follows a strategy S, we will let KSn stand for his capital at the
end of step n (as a function of Forecaster’s and Reality’s moves). The additive
representation makes it obvious that Sceptic’s strategies can be mixed:
Lemma 3 If S1,S2, . . . is a sequence of strategies for Sceptic and p1, p2, . . . is
a sequence of positive weights summing to 1, there is a “master” strategy S for
Sceptic ensuring
KSn =
∞∑
k=1
pkKSkn .
Proof It suffices for Sceptic to set gn :=
∑∞
k=1 pkgk,n at each step n, where
gk,n is the move recommended by Sk.
Lemma 4 In the martingale protocol, Sceptic can force
∞∑
n=1
∫
ξ2ndPn <∞ =⇒ sup
N
N∑
n=1
ξn(ωn) <∞.
Proof It is easy to see that for each C > 0 there is a strategy, say SC , for
Sceptic leading to capital
KSCN =

1 +
1
C
((∑N
n=1 ξn(ωn)
)2
−∑Nn=1 ∫ ξ2ndPn
)
if
∑N
n=1
∫
ξ2ndPn ≤ C
KSCN−1 otherwise,
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for all N = 1, 2, . . . . It remains to mix all SC , C = 1, 2, . . ., according to Lemma
3 (with arbitrary positive weights).
Lemma 5 In the submartingale protocol, Sceptic can force
∞∑
n=1
(∫
ξndPn +
∫
ξ2ndPn
)
<∞ =⇒ sup
N
N∑
n=1
ξn(ωn) <∞.
Proof It suffices to apply Lemma 4 to ξ˜n := ξn −
∫
ξndPn (notice that∫
ξ˜2ndPn ≤
∫
ξ2ndPn).
Let IE stand for the indicator of local event E ⊆ Ω:
IE(ω) :=
{
1 if ω ∈ E
0 otherwise.
The following lemma is a version of the Borel–Cantelli–Le´vy lemma.
Lemma 6 In the submartingale protocol, Sceptic can force(
∀n : ξn = IEn &
∞∑
n=1
Pn(En) <∞
)
=⇒ (ωn ∈ En for finitely many n) .
Proof This is a special case of Lemma 5.
Our application of the Borel–Cantelli–Le´vy lemma will be made possible by the
following lemma, which we state using the notation introduced earlier in (1).
Lemma 7 For each α ∈ (−1, 1) there exists a constant C = C(α) such that,
for all P I and P II,
P I
{
βI > eβII
} ≤ CD(α) (P I ‖ P II) .
Proof Let E stand for the event
{
βI > eβII
}
. Since
D(α)
(
P I ‖ P II) = 4
1− α2
(
1−
∫
Ω
(βI(ω))
1−α
2 (βII(ω))
1+α
2 Q(dω)
)
=
4
1− α2
∫
Ω
1− α
2
βI(ω) +
1 + α
2
βII(ω)− (βI(ω)) 1−α2 (βII(ω)) 1+α2 Q(dω)
≥ 4
1− α2
∫
E
1− α
2
βI(ω) +
1 + α
2
βII(ω)− (βI(ω)) 1−α2 (βII(ω)) 1+α2 Q(dω)
≥ 4
1− α2
∫
E
1− α
2
βI(ω) +
1 + α
2e
βI(ω)− (βI(ω)) 1−α2 (βI(ω)
e
) 1+α
2
Q(dω)
=
4
1− α2
(
1− α
2
+
1 + α
2e
− e− 1+α2
)
P I(E)
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(the first inequality follows from the fact that the geometric mean never exceeds
the arithmetic mean, and the second inequality uses the fact that for each β > 0
the function
1− α
2
β +
1 + α
2
x− β 1−α2 x 1+α2
is decreasing in x ∈ [0, β/e], which can be checked by differentiation), we can
set
C :=
1− α2
4
(
1− α
2
+
1 + α
2e
− e− 1+α2
)−1
> 0
(the expression in the parentheses is a positive function of α ∈ (−1, 1) since it
takes value 0 at α = −1 and α = 1 and the function is strictly concave).
We will also need the following elementary inequality, where U : R → R is
the truncation function
U(x) :=
{
x if x ≤ 1
1 otherwise.
Lemma 8 For each γ ∈ (0, 1) there exists B > 1 such that, for all x > 0,
xU(lnx) + xU2(lnx) ≤ B(x− 1) + B − 1
γ
(1− xγ) . (20)
Proof Let us first consider the case x ≤ e. To see that
x lnx+ x ln2 x ≤ B(x− 1) + B − 1
γ
(1− xγ)
notice that the values and the first derivatives of the two sides of this inequality
coincide when x = 1 (in fact, the coefficient B−1γ was chosen to match the
derivatives) and that the inequality for the second derivatives,
3 + 2 lnx
x
≤ (B − 1)(1− γ)
x2−γ
,
holds when B is sufficiently large (namely, when B ≥ 5e1−γ/(1− γ) + 1).
In the case x ≥ e, the inequality becomes
2x ≤ B(x− 1) + B − 1
γ
(1− xγ) ;
since it is true for x = e (by the previous paragraph), it suffices to make sure
that the inequality between the derivatives of the two sides holds:
2 ≤ B − (B − 1)xγ−1.
This can be achieved by making B ≥ (2e− eγ)/(e− eγ) > 2.
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Now we have all we need to prove Part 2 of Theorem 1b. Let us first assume
that the functions βIn and β
II
n are always positive and that E
I
n = E
II
n = ∅, for all
n. Our goal is to prove that Sceptic I can force
∞∑
n=1
D(α)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
<∞ =⇒ lim inf
n→∞
KIIn <∞.
Substituting
γ :=
1− α
2
, x :=
βIn
βIIn
in (20), multiplying by βIIn , integrating over Qn, and summing over n = 1, 2, . . .,
we obtain
∞∑
n=1
∫
βInU
(
ln
βIn
βIIn
)
+ βInU
2
(
ln
βIn
βIIn
)
dQn
≤ (B − 1)(1 + α)
2
∞∑
n=1
D(α)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
. (21)
Let us combine this inequality with:
• Lemma 5 applied to Sceptic I and ξn := U
(
ln
βIn
βIIn
)
. It is applicable because
the inequality xU(ln x) ≥ x− 1, valid for all x > 0, implies∫
ξndP
I
n =
∫
βIn
βIIn
U
(
ln
βIn
βIIn
)
βIIn dQn ≥
∫ (
βIn
βIIn
− 1
)
βIIn dQn = 0
(and ξn is P
I
n-integrable since ξn ≤ 1).
• Lemma 6 applied to Sceptic I and En := {βIn > eβIIn }. It will be applicable
by Lemma 7.
We can now see that it suffices to prove that Sceptic I can force
(
sup
N
N∑
n=1
U
(
ln
βIn(ωn)
βIIn (ωn)
)
<∞ & βIn(ωn) ≤ eβIIn (ωn) from some n on
)
=⇒ lim inf
n→∞
KIIn <∞. (22)
Forcing (22) can be achieved by forcing
sup
N
N∑
n=1
ln
βIn(ωn)
βIIn (ωn)
<∞ =⇒ lim inf
n→∞
KIIn <∞, (23)
and the latter can be done with the strategy
f In :=
βIIn
βIn
f IIn .
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It remains to get rid of the assumption βIn > 0, β
II
n > 0, E
I
n = E
II
n = ∅. Our
argument so far remains valid if the observation space Ω = Ωn is allowed to
depend on n (it can be chosen by Sceptic I’s opponents at any time prior to his
move). In particular, we can set Ωn := Ω \ (EIn ∪EIIn ) and assume, without loss
of generality, that βIn > 0 and β
II
n > 0 on Ωn. This proves Part 2 of Theorem
1b.
To deduce Part 2 of Theorem 1a from Part 2 of Theorem 1b, notice that,
for all n, P In(E
II
n ) = 0 (as P
I
n ≪ P IIn ). Therefore, P In(EIn ∪EIIn ) = 0, and mixing
(in the sense of Lemma 3) any of the strategies for Sceptic I whose existence is
asserted in Part 2 of Theorem 1b with the strategy
f In(ω) :=
{
∞ if ω ∈ EIn ∪ EIIn
1 otherwise
we obtain a strategy for Sceptic I satisfying the condition of Part 2 of Theorem
1a.
Remark Part 2 of Theorem 2 gives a precise lower bound for the rate of growth
of Sceptic I’s capital in terms of the rate of growth of Sceptic II’s capital and
the cumulative divergence between the Forecasters’ predictions. Unfortunately,
our proof of Part 2 of Theorems 1a and 1b does not give such a bound; the
step that prevents us from obtaining such a bound is replacing (22) with (23)
(another such step would have been the use of Doob’s martingale convergence
theorem, as in Shiryaev 1996, but this proof avoids it). It remains an open
problem whether such a bound exists.
5 The rate of growth of Sceptic II’s capital in
terms of the Kullback–Leibler divergence
Suppose Forecaster I is reliable and Sceptic I invests a part of his capital in
strategies whose existence is asserted in Theorem 2. That theorem then gives
rather precise bounds for the achievable rate of growth of KIIn : Sceptic II can
achieve
lnKIIN ≥
1− α
2
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)−O(1) (24)
but cannot achieve more than that:
lnKIIN ≤
1− α
2
N∑
n=1
D[α]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+O(1). (25)
The problem with this is that (24) and (25) refer to different αs: α ∈ (−1, 1) in
(24) and α < −1 in (25). In this section we will derive similar (albeit cruder)
bounds for the same α-divergence, namely for α = −1, one of the two cases
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that have been excluded so far. The (−1)-divergence, or the Kullback–Leibler
divergence, is defined by
D(−1)
(
P I ‖ P II) := ∫
Ω
ln
βI(ω)
βII(ω)
P I(dω),
using the notation of (1). Somewhat related results have been obtained in
algorithmic randomness theory by Solomonoff (1978); see also Vovk (1989),
Theorem 2.2.
Remark It might be tempting to set α < −1 in (10). This will not lead to any
useful bounds because of the possibility KIn → 0.
For simplicity, we will again impose the assumption of “timidity” (in a much
stronger sense than before) on Forecaster II: on the given play of the game,
his predictions should stay within a constant factor of the reliable Forecaster
I. More precisely, Forecaster II is c-timid, for a constant c > 1, if for all n the
ratio βIIn /β
I
n (with 0/0 interpreted as 1) is bounded above by c and bounded
below by 1/c. The value of the constant c is not disclosed to the players, and
the strategies for the Sceptics constructed in this section will never depend on
c.
Let x+ stand for max(x, 0).
Theorem 3 Let c > 1. There is a constant C > 0 depending only on c such
that:
1. The Sceptics have a joint strategy in the competitive testing protocol that
guarantees, starting from N = 3,
lnKIIN ≥
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− C
√
N
ln lnN
(
ln+KIN + ln lnN
)
(26)
on the plays where Forecaster II is c-timid.
2. Sceptic I has a strategy that guarantees, starting from N = 3,
lnKIIN ≤
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+ C
√
N
ln lnN
(
ln+KIN + ln lnN
)
(27)
on the plays where Forecaster II is c-timid.
Before proving Theorem 3, we will state a similar result for the case where the
duration of the game, N , is known in advance. (Theorem 3 is applicable in this
case as well, but it can be made more precise.)
Proposition 1 Let c > 1. There is a constant C > 0 depending only on c such
that:
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1. For each N ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, the Sceptics have a joint strategy that guarantees
lnKIIN ≥
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− (√N − 1) (lnKIN + C) (28)
on the plays where Forecaster II is c-timid.
2. For each N ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, Sceptic I has a strategy that guarantees
lnKIIN ≤
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+
(√
N + 1
) (
lnKIN + C
)
(29)
on the plays where Forecaster II is c-timid.
The intuition behind Theorem 3 and Proposition 1 is that Sceptic II can
achieve the growth rate of his logarithmic capital close to the growth rate of
the cumulative Kullback–Leibler divergence between P In and P
II
n , but cannot
achieve a better growth rate. Theorem 3 is related to the law of the iterated
logarithm, in that it gives the accuracy ofO(
√
N ln lnN) for a reliable Forecaster
I, whereas Proposition 1 is related to the central limit theorem, in that it gives
the accuracy of O(
√
N).
5.1 Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3 and Proposition 1
Substituting α := −1 + 2ǫ, with ǫ ∈ (0, 1), in (10) gives
1
ǫ
lnKIN +
1
1− ǫ lnK
II
N =
N∑
n=1
D[−1+2ǫ]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
,
which can be rewritten as
lnKIIN = −
1
ǫ
N∑
n=1
ln
∫ (
βIIn
βIn
)ǫ
dP In −
1− ǫ
ǫ
lnKIN . (30)
The inequality ex ≤ 1 + x+ x22 ex
+
gives
(
βIIn
βIn
)ǫ
= exp
(
ǫ ln
βIIn
βIn
)
≤ 1 + ǫ ln β
II
n
βIn
+
1
2
ǫ2 ln2
βIIn
βIn
exp
(
ǫ ln+
βIIn
βIn
)
≤ 1 + ǫ ln β
II
n
βIn
+
1
2
ǫ2cǫ ln2 c.
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This further implies
−1
ǫ
N∑
n=1
ln
∫ (
βIIn
βIn
)ǫ
dP In
≥ −1
ǫ
N∑
n=1
ln
(
1− ǫD(−1) (P In ‖ P IIn )+ 12 ǫ2cǫ ln2 c
)
(31)
≥ −1
ǫ
N∑
n=1
(
−ǫD(−1) (P In ‖ P IIn )+ 12ǫ2cǫ ln2 c
)
(32)
=
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− 1
2
Nǫcǫ ln2 c
(the transition from (31) to (32) uses the inequality lnx ≤ x − 1, valid for
x ≥ 0; the expression in the parentheses in (31) is nonnegative because of its
provenance). Plugging the last inequality into (30), we obtain
lnKIIN ≥
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− 1
2
Nǫcǫ ln2 c− 1− ǫ
ǫ
lnKIN . (33)
If N is known in advance (but c and KIN are not), we can set ǫ := N−1/2 in
(33), which gives
lnKIIN ≥
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− 1
2
√
NcN
−1/2
ln2 c−
(√
N − 1
)
lnKIN ;
this proves (28) with, e.g., C := 2c ln2 c (in fact, we can take C arbitrarily close
to 12 ln
2 c if we only want (28) to hold for sufficiently large N).
In the case of Theorem 3, where N is unknown, we will use the discrete
form (Vovk 1987b, Theorem 1) of Ville’s (1939) method of proving the law of
the iterated logarithm (however, without worrying about constant factors). The
method is based on the following simple corollary of Lemma 3. If S2,S3, . . . is a
sequence of strategies for Sceptic and p2, p3, . . . is a sequence of positive weights
summing to 1, there is a strategy S for Sceptic ensuring lnKSN ≥ lnKSkN + ln pk
for all k = 2, 3, . . . . In particular, taking pk ∝ k−2, k = 2, 3, . . ., we obtain
lnKSN ≥ lnKSkN − 2 lnk for k ≥ 2.
Let ǫ2, ǫ3, . . . be a sequence of positive numbers, to be specified later on.
Since for each k = 2, 3, . . . the Sceptics can ensure (33) for ǫ := ǫk (using simple
strategies (12)–(13) depending only on the Forecasters’ predictions), they can
also ensure, for all k = 2, 3, . . .,
lnKIIN + 2 lnk ≥
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− C1Nǫk − 1− ǫk
ǫk
(
lnKIN + 2 lnk
)
(34)
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where C1 (as well as C2 to C6 below) is a constant depending only on c. Weak-
ening (34) to
lnKIIN ≥
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− C1Nǫk − 1
ǫk
lnKIN −
2 ln k
ǫk
and setting
k := ⌈lnN⌉, ǫk :=
√
ln k
ek
(35)
(so that ǫk coincides with
√
ln lnN/N to within a constant factor), we further
obtain
lnKIIN ≥
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)− C2√N ln lnN − C3
√
N
ln lnN
ln+KIN
for N ≥ 3. This essentially coincides with (26).
Remark The strategies for Sceptic II constructed in our proof of Part 1 of The-
orem 3 and Proposition 1 was somewhat complex, especially in the case of The-
orem 3. In the spirit of Solomonoff (1978), we could take the simple “likelihood
ratio” strategy f IIn := β
I
n/β
II
n . The expected value of ln f
II
n with respect to P
I
n is
D(−1)(P In ‖P IIn ), and according to standard results of game-theoretic probability
Sceptic I can become infinitely rich unless lnKIIN ≈
∑N
n=1D
(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
. The
law of the iterated logarithm (see, e.g., Shafer and Vovk 2001, Chapter 5) will
give a result similar to Part 1 of Theorem 3, and the weak law of large numbers
(in the form of Proposition 6.1 in Shafer and Vovk 2001) or the central limit
theorem (Shafer and Vovk 2001, Chapters 6–7) will give results similar to Part
1 of Proposition 1. An advantage of the proofs given in this subsection is that
they show the dependence of Sceptic II’s capital on Sceptic I’s capital; it re-
mains to be seen whether such explicit dependence can be achieved using limit
theorems of game-theoretic probability.
5.2 Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 3 and Proposition 1
Substituting α := −1− 2ǫ, with ǫ > 0, in (11) gives
−1
ǫ
lnKIN +
1
1 + ǫ
lnKIIN ≤
N∑
n=1
D[−1−2ǫ]
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
,
or, equivalently,
lnKIIN ≤
1
ǫ
N∑
n=1
ln
∫ (
βIn
βIIn
)ǫ
dP In +
1 + ǫ
ǫ
lnKIN . (36)
Analogously to the transition from (30) to (33) but now using(
βIn
βIIn
)ǫ
≤ 1 + ǫ ln β
I
n
βIIn
+
1
2
ǫ2cǫ ln2 c
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and
1
ǫ
N∑
n=1
ln
∫ (
βIn
βIIn
)ǫ
dP In ≤
1
ǫ
N∑
n=1
ln
(
1 + ǫD(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+
1
2
ǫ2cǫ ln2 c
)
≤
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+
1
2
Nǫcǫ ln2 c,
we obtain
lnKIIN ≤
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+
1
2
Nǫcǫ ln2 c+
1+ ǫ
ǫ
lnKIN .
If N is known in advance, setting ǫ := N−1/2 gives
lnKIIN ≤
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+
(
C4 + lnKIN
) (√
N + 1
)
and so completes the proof of Proposition 1. (We can take C := c ln2 c in (29),
or, if we are interested in (29) holding from some N on, C ≈ 12 ln2 c.)
As for Theorem 3, we now have
lnKIIN ≤
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+
1
2
Nǫkc
ǫk ln2 c+
1 + ǫk
ǫk
(
lnKIN + 2 lnk
)
.
Setting, as before, (35), we now obtain
lnKIIN ≤
N∑
n=1
D(−1)
(
P In ‖ P IIn
)
+ C5
√
N ln lnN + C6
(
1 +
√
N
ln lnN
)(
ln+KIN + 2 ln lnN
)
,
which completes the proof of Theorem 3.
6 Criteria of absolute continuity and singularity
A simple measure-theoretic counterpart of the competitive testing protocol is the
measurable space Ω∞ equipped with two probability measures, PI,PII ∈ P(Ω∞).
The generic element of Ω∞ will be denoted ω1ω2 . . . . Let P
I
n (resp. P
II
n ) be a
regular conditional distribution of ωn given ω1 . . . ωn−1 w.r. to the probability
measure PI (resp. PII). (For regular conditional distributions to exist it suffices
to assume that Ω is a Borel space: see, e.g., Shiryaev 1996, Theorem II.7.5.)
The strategies of the two Forecasters are fixed: Forecaster I is playing P In and
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Forecaster II is playing P IIn ; therefore, they cease to be active players in the
game.
We will consider the filtration (Fn)∞n=0 where each Fn is generated by
ω1, . . . , ωn and sometimes write F for F∞. By a normalized nonnegative
measure-theoretic martingale w.r. to a probability measure P on Ω∞ we will
mean a martingale (ξn)
∞
n=0 (see, e.g., Shiryaev 1996, Chapter VII) w.r. to P and
(Fn)∞n=0 such that ξ0 = 1 and ξn ≥ 0 for all n = 1, 2, . . .; we will allow ξn to take
value ∞ (of course, with probability zero). We will usually write ξ(ω1, . . . , ωn)
for ξn(ω1, ω2, . . .) and regard ξ as a function on the set Ω
∗ of all finite sequences
of elements of Ω. A normalized nonnegative game-theoretic martingale w.r. to
P (either PI or PII) is Sceptic’s (either Sceptic I’s or Sceptic II’s, respectively)
capital represented as a function of Reality’s moves ω1 . . . ωn.
To state the connection between measure-theoretic and game-theoretic no-
tions of normalized nonnegative martingale (in the current measure-theoretic
framework), let us say that two processes (i.e., measurable functions on Ω∗)
are equivalent (w.r. to P) if they coincide P-almost surely. It is customary
in measure-theoretic probability to identify equivalent processes (although this
practice does not carry over to the game-theoretic framework). It is easy to see
that the normalized nonnegative measure-theoretic martingales are the closure
of the measurable normalized nonnegative game-theoretic martingales w.r. to
this relation of equivalence.
The following proposition is a special case of the infinitary version of Ville’s
theorem; for a proof see, e.g., Shafer and Vovk (2001), Proposition 8.14.
Proposition 2 Let E ∈ F and P be either PI or PII.
1. If a normalized nonnegative measure-theoretic martingale diverges to in-
finity when E happens, then PE = 0.
2. If PE = 0, then there is a normalized nonnegative measure-theoretic mar-
tingale that diverges to infinity if E happens.
This proposition is also true for the measurable normalized nonnegative game-
theoretic martingales and establishes the connection between the game-theoretic
and measure-theoretic notions of a “null event”: for example, an event (in the
measure-theoretic sense, i.e., a measurable subset of Ω∞) E satisfies PI(E) = 0
if and only if Sceptic I has a measurable strategy that makes him infinitely rich
on E.
The following is a special case of the Kabanov–Liptser–Shiryaev (1977) cri-
terion of absolute continuity and singularity. For simplicity we assume that
P
I
∣∣∣
Fn
≪ PII
∣∣∣
Fn
for all n (this is the standard assumption of local absolute con-
tinuity, which simplifies measure-theoretic results: see, e.g., Jacod and Shiryaev
2003, Sect. IV.2c). This will ensure the timidity of Forecaster II (at least after
changing the regular conditional distributions on a set of probability zero, both
under PI and PII).
Corollary 1 In the measure-theoretic competitive testing protocol:
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1. For any α ∈ (−1, 1), PI ≪ PII if and only if (3) holds PI-almost surely.
2. For any α ∈ (−1, 1), PI ⊥ PII if and only if (2) holds PI-almost surely.
Proof We start from Part “if” of Part 1. Suppose (3) holds PI-almost surely
and E is an event such that PII(E) = 0; our goal is to prove that PI(E) = 0. Let
Sceptic II play a measurable strategy that makes him infinitely rich on the event
E, and let Sceptic I play the half-and-half mixture (in the sense of Lemma 3) of
the following two strategies: one of the measurable strategies whose existence
is guaranteed in Part 2 of Theorem 1a (cf. the remark following this proof) and
a measurable strategy that makes him infinitely rich when the event (3) fails
to happen. It is easy to check that Sceptic I is guaranteed to become infinitely
rich on the event E, no matter whether (3) holds or not. Therefore, indeed
P
I(E) = 0.
Next we prove Part “only if” of Part 1. Fix measurable strategies SI and
SII for the Sceptics that make at least one of them infinitely rich when the
event (3) fails to happen; Part 1 of Theorem 1a guarantees that such strategies
exist. Sceptic II will play strategy SII whereas Sceptic I will play a mixture of
SI and another strategy. Let E be the event that Sceptic II becomes infinitely
rich. Since PII(E) = 0 and PI ≪ PII, we have PI(E) = 0 and so Sceptic I has
a measurable strategy that makes him infinitely rich on E; let him play the
half-and-half mixture of this strategy and SI. This strategy for Sceptic I will
guarantee his becoming infinitely rich whenever (3) fails to happen.
The proof of Part “if” of Part 2 again relies on Part 1 of Theorem 1a. Define
SI and SII as before, let Sceptic II play SII, and let Sceptic I play the half-and-
half mixture of SI and a measurable strategy that makes him infinitely rich
when (2) fails to happen. It is clear that one of the Sceptics becomes infinitely
rich no matter what happens. Therefore, PI and PII are mutually singular (e.g.,
take E as the event that Sceptic I becomes infinitely rich; then PI(E) = 0 and
P
II(Ω∞ \ E) = 0).
It remains to prove Part “only if” of Part 2. Let E be an event such that
P
II(E) = 0 and PI(E) = 1. Let Sceptic II play a measurable strategy that makes
him infinitely rich on E and let Sceptic I play the half-and-half mixture of the
following two strategies: one of the measurable strategies whose existence is
guaranteed in Part 2 of Theorem 1a and a measurable strategy that makes him
infinitely rich when the event E fails to happen. Now if the event (2) fails to
happen, Sceptic I is guaranteed to become infinitely rich, regardless of whether
E happens. This completes the proof.
Remark Notice that to deduce Corollary 1 we need slightly more than stated in
Theorem 1a: namely, we need measurable strategies for the Sceptics (in the case
of Part 1) or Sceptic I (in the case of Part 2). It is easy to see that the strate-
gies constructed in Theorem 1a satisfy this property, but it would have been
awkward to include their measurability in the statement. The strategies are not
only measurable but also computable, which is a much stronger property. There-
fore, it would have been more natural to include the strategies’ computability
in the statement of Theorem 1a; however, this would significantly complicate
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the exposition, especially that there are several popular non-equivalent defini-
tions of computability, even for real-valued functions of real variable. Following
Shafer and Vovk (2001), we dropped any references to the properties of regu-
larity of the constructed strategies for the Sceptics in the formal statements of
our results.
To discuss the intuition behind Corollary 1, let us assume that Forecaster I
is reliable in the following measure-theoretic sense: we do not expect an event
E to happen if it is chosen in advance and satisfies PI(E) = 0. Then PI ≪ PII
means that Forecaster II is “automatically reliable”: if E is chosen in advance
and satisfies PII(E) = 0, we also do not expect it to happen. Part 1 of Corollary
1 says that Forecaster II is automatically reliable if and only if the Forecasters’
predictions are close in the sense of (3) holding almost surely w.r. to the reliable
probability measure PI.
On the other hand, PI ⊥ PII means that Forecaster II is “automatically
unreliable”: we can choose in advance an event E which we expect to happen
(PI(E) = 1) but which will falsify the probability measure PII (PII(E) = 0).
Part 2 of Corollary 1 says that Forecaster II is automatically unreliable if and
only if the Forecasters’ predictions are far apart in the sense of (2) holding
almost surely w.r. to the reliable probability measure PI.
The game-theoretic Theorem 1a has several advantages over Corollary 1.
First of all, Theorem 1a is “pointwise”: it carries information about specific
plays of the game. It also has the flexibility provided by the game-theoretic
framework in general:
• the Forecasters can react to the Sceptics’ moves (and Reality can react to
both the Forecasters and the Sceptics);
• all players can react to various events outside the protocol;
• game-theoretic results about merging of opinions, unlike the standard
measure-theoretic results about absolute continuity and singularity, do
not depend on the (vast) parts of the space Ω∗ that are never reached or
even approached by Reality.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Akio Fujiwara and Phil Dawid for encouragement and useful
discussions.
References
Amari, S., and Nagaoka, H. (2000). Methods of information geometry. Provi-
dence, RI: American Mathematical Society. Japanese original (1993): Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten.
Blackwell, D., and Dubins, L. (1962). Merging of opinions with increasing in-
formation. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 33, 882–886.
24
Dawid, A. P. (1984). Statistical theory: the prequential approach. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society A, 147, 278–292.
Dawid, A. P. (1985). Calibration-based empirical probability (with discussion).
Annals of Statistics, 13, 1251–1285.
Dawid, A. P. (2004). Probability, causality and the empirical world: a Bayes–de
Finetti–Popper–Borel synthesis. Statistical Science, 19, 44–57.
Dawid, A. P., Vovk, V. (1999). Prequential probability: principles and proper-
ties. Bernoulli, 5, 125–162.
de Finetti, B. (1937). La pre´vision, ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives.
Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincare´, 7, 1–68. English translation (1980):
Foresight: its logical laws, its subjective sources. In H. E. Kyburg, Jr, and
H. E. Smokler (Ed.) Studies in subjective probability (pp. 53–118). Hunting-
ton, NY: Krieger. Second edition. First edition (1964): New York: Wiley.
Feldman, J. (1958). Equivalence and perpendicularity of Gaussian measures.
Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 8, 699–708.
Fujiwara, A. (2007). Randomness criteria in terms of α-divergences. Manuscript.
Greenwood, P. E., Shiryaev, A. N. (1985). Contiguity and the statistical invari-
ance principle. New York: Gordon & Breach.
Ha´jek, J. (1958). On a property of normal distribution of an arbitrary stochastic
process (in Russian). Czechoslovak Mathematical Journal, 8 :610–618.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. Economic Journal, 39, 41–57.
Jacod, J., Shiryaev, A. N. (2003). Limit theorems for stochastic processes. Berlin:
Springer. Second edition.
Kabanov, Y. M., Liptser, R. S., and Shiryaev, A. N. (1977). On the question of
absolute continuity and singularity of probability measures. Mathematics of
the USSR—Sbornik, 33, 203–221.
Kakutani, S. (1948). On equivalence of infinite product measures. Annals of
Mathematics, 49, 214–224.
Kumon, M., Takemura, A., Takeuchi, K. (2007). Game-theoretic versions of
strong law of large numbers for unbounded variables. Stochastics, to appear.
Pukelsheim, F. (1986). Predictable criteria for absolute continuity and singular-
ity of two probability measures. Statistics and Decisions, 4, 227-236.
Re´nyi, A. (1961). On measures of information and entropy. In Proceedings of
the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability
(Vol. 1, pp. 547–561). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
25
Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley. Second
edition (1972): New York: Dover.
Shafer, G., Vovk, V. (2001). Probability and finance: it’s only a game! New
York: Wiley.
Shiryaev, A. N. (1996). Probability. New York: Springer. Second edition. Third
Russian edition published in 2004.
Solomonoff, R. J. (1978). Complexity-based induction systems: comparisons
and convergence theorems. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-
24, 422–432,
Ville, J. (1939). Etude critique de la notion de collectif. Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
Vovk, V. (1987a). On a randomness criterion. Soviet Mathematics Doklady, 35,
656–660.
Vovk, V. (1987b). The law of the iterated logarithm for random Kolmogorov, or
chaotic, sequences. Theory of Probability and its Applications, 32, 413–425.
Vovk, V. (1989). Prediction of stochastic sequences. Problems of Information
Transmission, 25, 285–296.
Vovk, V. (1993). A logic of probability, with application to the foundations of
statistics (with discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 55,
317–351.
Vovk, V., Shafer, G. (2005). Good randomized sequential probability forecasting
is always possible. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 67, 747–763.
26
